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1. Background 
The purpose of this report and the exercise in the workshop is to discuss the CatSim 
(Catastrophe Simulation) approach to incorporate disaster risk management (DRM) into 
fiscal and development planning processes, as well as explore the feasibility of using 
disaster risk management options for reducing risk. It should support the ongoing CPGU 
(Cellule de prevention et gestion des urgencies) led study on “Mainstreaming Disaster 
Risk Management and Climate Change in Economic Development,” which aims to 
 
• quantify and model natural hazard risk for Madagascar in an objective fashion that 
will represent a scientific and numerical basis to inform sector-specific risk 
management practices 
• produce solid and validated future impact scenarios that will enable stakeholders to 
make informed decisions on adaptive measures. 
• build national capacity and coordination between the adaptation and hazard risk 
management institutions; 
• produce a risk model for Madagascar that will inform the decisions and development 
of more effective risk financing options.  
 
The report and associated modeling approach will support the overall study primarily 
through the assessment of the financial impacts of natural hazards on the Malagasy 
economy and the development of scenarios that will inform the financial strategies of the 
government, to manage their exposure to climate-related risk. Particular focus will be on 
the impacts of tropical cyclones, which tend to lead to widespread losses in the 
agricultural sector, and can result in severe damages to built infrastructure. The financial 
impacts of cyclones on the national economy is systematically assessed through a 
transparent modeling approach that gives the Malagasy stakeholders guidelines and a tool 
to better manage the financial risk arising from natural disasters now and in the future. 
 
The two-day workshop that this document supports was intended to put the concepts into 
practice by allowing participants to work through a practical example of policy making in 
a risk based manner. The CatSim model aids in the analysis of public disaster risk 
management options. Furthermore, detailed descriptions of each step will be given in the 
appendices within the report. 
 
Incorporating disaster risk management into fiscal and development planning requires 
consideration of three main issues: (i) risk reduction (preventing and loss mitigation); (ii) 
risk transfer; and (iii) financing the recovery. The emphasis here is on risk transfer and 
financing the recovery process, that is, the economic and fiscal considerations. To 
incorporate risk reduction into development planning would require extensive 
information on the human losses, which is not emphasized here. The development of a 
viable strategy requires policy-makers to consider their country’s risk profile, 
development plans, as well as the government’s fiscal, budget and debt situation.  
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Finance and planning policy makers wishing to proactively manage their country’s 
contingent fiscal liabilities must keep in mind a number of general questions: 
 
• Who assumes the risk – government or the commercial private sector, the rest of civil 
society and donors? 
• What risk reduction priorities support the broader goals of development planning? 
• How can risk financing instruments effectively encourage risk reduction measures? 
• How can the policy process for managing contingent liabilities be mainstreamed in 
fiscal and budget planning, with stakeholders included? 
• What might be the respective roles of the public and private sectors as well as 
international financial institutions and other donors in disaster risk management? 
 
To address these and other questions, the report and the workshop aimed to discuss and 
put forward a disaster risk management strategy for Madagascar. The discussion does not 
represent the full economic and political reality. The intent is to start developing an 
approach to important and complex issues underlying disaster risk management in 
Madagascar. The report continues with a discussion of the socio-economic environment 
and the impacts disasters have had on Madagascar, before the systematic risk assessment 
and management of CatSim is utilized to analyze the potential financial and economic 
consequence of disasters. 
 
The policy applications of the CatSim analysis can provide insights on the development 
and use of indicators of vulnerability, resilience, coping capacity and other concepts 
important for policy interventions with regard to disasters and other global-change 
phenomena.  CatSim relies on quantitative indicators, e.g. risk is estimated making use of 
historical statistics and exposure; financial resilience is estimated with an index of 
observations on the financial preparedness of the government; financial vulnerability is a 
composite of the two and is measured in terms of the financing gap. Clearly, financial 
vulnerability of the public sector presents only one aspect, albeit an import one, of 
vulnerability to natural hazards.  However, other indicators are necessary in order to 
complement this concept.  Furthermore, participation and transparency in the design, 
estimation and use of vulnerability indicators is essential for their legitimacy.  As there is 
a substantial degree of uncertainty in estimates of disasters risks and financial 
vulnerability, it is important that users have full participation in their design, estimation 
and use. Therefore, CatSim is a participatory, interactive tool for building capacity of 
policy makers by sensitizing them to the tradeoffs inherent in planning for disasters.  
 
Before the in-depth discussion of economic and financial vulnerability due to cyclone 
risk in Madagascar in the next chapter, some general remarks about predictability, 
uncertainty and risk management should be kept in mind. 
 
- Future cyclone events cannot be predicted with absolute accuracy and it is very 
unlikely that it will ever be possible to predict a storm’s exact trajectory through a 
country as well as its physical strength (e.g. wind speed) beyond the immediate 
future. The good news is that it is possible to assess the likeliness/risk (i.e. the 
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probability of occurrence as well as its intensity) of cyclone events and 
corresponding losses for specific locations/regions.   
 
- While it is now commonly agreed that a probabilistic (or risk based) approach is 
the most appropriate one for managing extremes, it is highly complex and 
multifaceted. For example, information about past losses is usually scarce (and 
not very detailed) but is ultimately needed for estimation and calibration purposes. 
As a consequence, uncertainties of possible future losses without such 
information are large and only can be reduced in the future if better information is 
available on the different dimensions needed to assess risk. This does not only 
include spatially explicit gathering of additional exposure and vulnerability data 
but also comprises the detailed analysis of all important dimensions (including 
non-quantifiable ones) of future events. Hence, loss assessment and data gathering 
must be done on a regular basis so that uncertainties about the current and future 
risk level can be reduced over time.  
 
- It should be acknowledged that instruments to reduce or spread risks come with a 
price and sometimes result in huge opportunity costs (probably hard to be 
quantified). Hence, for successful implementation of risk reduction and risk 
financing measures, a systems analytic approach which includes all relevant 
stakeholders and sectors needs to be adopted, emphasizing that additional 
structures and institutions have to be built to mainstream disaster risk into 
sustainable development planning processes. Additionally, relevant actors should 
recognize that different instruments to decrease or hedge risk are only successful 
for some risk layers and will not be able to decrease all risk to zero or the required 
minimum.  
 
The issues mentioned above will be discussed thoroughly in the subsequent sections, 
especially in the recommendation chapter. The report itself is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction into the current socio-economic situation in 
Madagascar as well as its natural disaster risk. In Chapter 3, the CatSim framework is 
presented and each step is discussed in detail. Chapter 4 is divided into 5 subsections, 
each of them looking at specific steps of the CatSim approach, including the estimation 
of relevant parameters and simulation runs for determining the financial risk of cyclone 
events to the government. Afterwards, Chapter 5 takes a closer look at possible pro-active 
risk reduction as well as risk financing strategies discussed during the workshop (chapter 
6). Chapter 7 gives a summary of the results and recommendations for the future. The 
Appendix includes mostly technical notes about the estimation and simulation procedures 
used throughout the report. Appendix 1 presents the approaches used within catastrophe 
models. Appendix 2 describes the statistical estimation methods used to assess cyclone 
risk based on past data. Appendix 3 describes the procedural estimation of capital stock. 
Appendix 4 introduces the algorithm used to calculate the financial resilience of the 
government. Appendix 5 introduces the Solow-growth model approach used for the 
macroeconomic model. Afterwards, Appendix 6 describes in detail how a multi-risk 
assessment approach could be performed (also implemented in the CatSim model) and 
finally Appendix 7 provides a short summary of the workshop. 
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2. Introduction: Socio-economic Situation in Madagascar and 
Natural Disaster Risk 
Madagascar has been confronted in the past with a series of economic challenges (see 
Thomas 2011 for a summary). Poverty remains a major challenge, with approximately 77 
percent of the population living below the poverty line in 2010 (INSTAT 2011); 
additionally, due to a number of factors, GDP per capita has effectively been reduced 
over the last decades and now amounts to about half of its level in 1960 (World Bank 
2012). The current political situation has contributed to the nation’s economic challenges 
(CIA Factbook 2012). 
 
Madagascar’s economy is essentially based on subsistence-agriculture, fishery and 
forestry, with the primary sector employing over 80 percent of the active population and 
contributing about 30 percent of the total GDP. Furthermore, it accounts for 60-65 
percent of the national export revenues (see Figure below).  
 
 
 
Fig. 0:  Composition of real GDP. Source: Government of Madagascar 2012. 
 
Until 2010, the export of clothing was a rising sector (the secondary sector contributed 
around 16 percent of total GDP), until regulatory complications abruptly halted these 
exports, leading to a sharp decline in production (World Bank 2012; CIA Factbook, 
2012).  The tertiary sector represents the largest share to GDP  (with around 55 percent, 
see also the general macroeconomic discussion below).   
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Climate Baseline and Future Projections 
 
Generally speaking, Madagascar’s climate is highly varied, with two main seasons: From 
November to April there is a hot, rainy season (with maximum rainfall in December and 
January) and from May to October there is a cool, dry season (with minimum rainfall in 
September and October). However, during the dry season, rainfall is restricted mainly to 
the southern and eastern coasts. The east coast is located in the path of destructive 
cyclones from the Indian Ocean that occur during the rainy season, whereas the west 
coast is generally drier, especially between May and October, while the southwest and 
the extreme south are semi-desert environments (Figure 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1: Total annual precipitation and temperature across Madagascar. 
Source: GFDRR, 2011 
 
Recent analysis of past climate data revealed that temperatures have increased by 0.2 
degrees in northern Madagascar and by 0.1 degrees in southern Madagascar. 
Furthermore, increases in daily minimum temperature – and also partially for maximum 
temperature – were found. Also, rainfall distribution seems to have changed over time, 
and a reduction in winter and spring rainfall has been detected. Additionally, in central 
and east coastal regions, rainfall has recently declined, accompanied by increases in the 
length of dry spells (Tadross et al., 2008). Regarding future climate change impacts, there 
are still a range uncertainties involved within the projections (see for example the 
Madagascar Climate Change Briefing, GFDRR 2011). However, it is expected that the 
frequency of cyclone events in the Indian Ocean will decrease, but cyclone intensity is 
projected to increase by 46 percent and shift northwards (World Bank, 2010).  
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Fig. 2: Total annual precipitation and temperature across Madagascar. 
Source: CHRR, 2010 (in GFDRR 2011) 
 
As Figure 2 indicates, mortality risks are especially high for the southern and western 
parts of Madagascar in the case of drought, and for the northern and eastern part of 
Madagascar in the case of cyclone events.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Number of people affected by storms, floods and droughts (1970-2010) in Madagascar. 
Source: GFDRR, 2011 
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Disasters are a Constant Threat 
 
Madagascar can be subjected to different types of hazards, including cyclones, floods and 
droughts (see Figure 3 above). Looking back at the last 40 years to determine the top 10 
natural disasters in terms of loss of life, total number of people affected and economic 
losses, one can see (Table 1) that cyclones pose a large threat to human life and cause the 
highest economic losses. 
 
Table 1: Top 10 natural disasters in terms of killed, number affected and economic damages.   
                    Source: EM-DAT, 2012. 
 
 
Top 10 Natural Disasters - number 
killed: 
Disaster type Date No 
 Killed 
Epidemic  Mar-1999  860  
Epidemic  Jul-2002  671  
Wind Storm  Mar-2004  363  
Wind Storm  Jan-1994  200  
Drought  Apr-1988  200  
Wind Storm  Jan-1997  140  
Wind Storm  Feb-2000  130  
Epidemic  Dec-1999  121  
Wind Storm  Mar-2010 120 
Wind Storm `Dec-1981 107 
 
 
 
Top 10 Natural Disasters - number 
affected: 
Disaster type Date No  
Affected 
Wind Storm  Feb-1972  2,510,056  
Drought  1981  1,000,000  
Wind Storm  Mar-2004  988,139  
Drought  Apr-1988  950,000  
Wind Storm  Feb-2000  736,937  
Drought 2008 720,000 
Wind Storm  Jan-1997  600,000  
Drought  Nov-2002  600,000  
Wind Storm  Jan-1994  540,043  
Wind Storm  May-2002  526,200  
 
 
 
Top 10 Natural Disasters - economic 
damage: 
Disaster 
type 
Date Damage 
US* (000's) 
Wind Storm  Feb-1977  350,000  
Wind Storm  Dec-1981  250,000  
Wind Storm  Mar-1982  250,000  
Wind Storm  Apr-1984  250,000  
Wind Storm  Mar-2004  250,000  
Wind Storm Mar-2007 240,000 
Wind Storm  Mar-1986  150,000  
Flood  Jan-2003  150,000  
Wind Storm  Dec-1978  29,000  
Wind Storm  Dec-1983  25,000  
 
 
By comparing events occurring between 1968 and 2011, one also can see that cyclones 
pose the largest threat and cause the highest death toll on average (see Table 2). 
  
Table 2: Average losses due to different types of hazards for a time period between 1968 and   
                    2011. Source: EM-DAT, 2012. 
  Number 
of 
Events 
Killed Total Affected Damage US$ (000's)
Drought 6 200 3,515,290 - 
average per event  33 585,882 - 
Flood 5 52 131,210 150,000 
average per event  9 26,242 30,000 
Wind Storm  45 2,372 9,174,315 1,977,301 
average per event  53 203,874 43,940 
 
 
There is also an indication that cyclone-related mortality risk has been increasing in 
recent decades (see Figure 4). However, the trend is not very robust, due to the limited 
number of data points, necessitating further examination. Also, the causes of a possible 
increase can be very complex and the issue must be examined within the wider context of 
socio-economic development issues. 
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Fig. 4: Figure: Cyclone related mortality. Source: UN 2007. 
 
 
Disasters are rare events and their occurrence is subject to fluctuations. As Figure 5 
shows, cyclones have had the highest annual recurrence, with 0.7 events per year, over a 
20-year time span. Less recurrent are droughts and floods. It should be noted that due to 
the limited time horizon such figures are only indicative and cannot be used for 
probabilistic risk assessment approaches. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Figure: Average number of disasters per year from 1980 to 2000.         
Source: UNDP 2003 
 
Today, cyclones continue to pose the largest threat, both in human and economic terms. 
The 2006 - 2007 cyclone season was a prime example, with seven tropical cyclones 
making landfall, heavily influencing precipitation levels and patterns on the island. The 
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last two cyclones alone impacted about 190,000 people and killed 150 (UN 2007). The 
recent 2011 - 2012 cyclone season also resulted in exceptional losses. 
 
Financial and Economic Impacts can be Substantial 
 
Cyclones in Madagascar have a large potential to cause substantial losses to crops and 
infrastructure and may eventually negatively affect economic and macroeconomic 
performance. 
 
Fig. 6: Effects of tropical cyclones Elita and Gafilo on macroeconomic performance. 
Source: Economic Outlook 2005. 
 
For example, Figure 6 shows that the GDP growth rate in 2004 decreased after two 
violent cyclones (Elita and Gafilo) that struck the country in the first quarter of the year. 
Also, one can see that other shocks, such as political instability in 2002, have marked and 
sometimes substantially larger effects on macroeconomic performance. However, it can 
also be acknowledged that the political crisis was transitory, while disaster impacts lasted 
longer (for more information on the former, see Hoftijzer and Paci, 2008). 
 
The most detailed assessment of losses and damages for a cyclone season ever done in 
Madagascar was for the 2008 cyclone season with the help of the World Bank et al. 
(2008) and is summarized here according to different dimensions. 
 
Disaster/Social/Economic information: 
 
• Cyclone season from mid-November to April. 
• Names and landfall dates: Fame (24.01.08); Ivan (07.02.08); Jokwe (04.03.08). 
• National poverty level in Madagascar was 63.3 percent 2007. 
• Damages are 52 percent of total and losses are 48 percent of around 333 million 
USD, losses are low because floods caused by the cyclones covered mainly rice 
cultivated areas, which are somewhat resistant to high water. 
• Damage and losses for public sector were 22 percent of total. 
• Most affected sectors of the economy were those of housing and public 
administration buildings (38 percent of total), agriculture, fishery and livestock 
(31 percent) and transport (14 percent). 
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• The intensity/impacts of the cyclones were different for different regions, the 
greatest being in Analanjirofo, experiencing 41.2 percent of total impacts. 
  
Impact: 
 
• Three consecutive cyclones (Fame, Ivan and Jokwe) affecting 17 of 22 regions. 
• 342,000 affected (total population: 19 million), among those 191,404 lost homes 
and 100 died. 
• Total damage and losses of about 333 million USD. 
• Concentrated in the agriculture, fisheries and livestock sector (103 million USD), 
housing and public administration sector (127.6 million USD) and transportation 
sector (45.7 million). 
• Mainly eastern coast affected (63 percent of total damages and losses). 
• Impact about 4 percent of GDP. 
• Decline of 0.3 percent of real GDP growth in 2008. 
• A 38 percent decline in the account of the balance of payments  (from 114.3 
million to 71.3 million Standard Drawing Rights), primarily due to reduction in 
agriculture exports, increase on imports of goods, and reduction of tourism 
services income. 
• Overall budget deficit increased from -4.9 to -5.0 percent of GDP in 2008. 
• Loss of estimated 6.2 million working days of labor, primarily in agriculture and 
fisheries sector.  Equivalent to a loss in earnings of 6.8 million USD. 
• 2.0 percent of commerce establishments and 1.9 percent of industrial enterprises 
were affected. 
• Loss per capita in some affected regions: 120 USD, 60 USD, 30 USD (GDP per 
capita is around 375 USD). 
• Majority of impact (over 259.3 million USD) was on the private sector. Damages 
and losses to public assets amounted to about 22 percent of the total (73.6 
million). 
 
Recovery and Reconstruction Requirements: 
 
• Financial requirements (public sector investments) of about 154.8 million USD: 
18.9 million USD for immediate recovery, 135.9 million needed for middle and 
long term recovery and reconstruction 
• By sector: social sector 52 million USD, 
                         productivity sector 10 million USD,  
                         infrastructure 80 million USD,  
                         cross-sectoral 11 million USD. 
• Government is expected to meet about 13 percent of total needs, e.g. 20.3 million 
USD, donor contributions expected to fund 28 percent (42.6 million), 23 percent 
are considered to be lower priority (35.9 million),  
• Call for Funds to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
(GFDRR) would cover 28 percent (43.1 million USD), while 8 percent (12.8 
million USD) would come from separate UN Funds. 
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Social Sectors: Education/Health/Nutrition/Housing 
 
• 657 schools damaged, 411 completely destroyed and 246 partially, amounting to 
about 3.2 million USD and 0.6 million USD damages respectively. 
• Total damages are 10.3 million, only public sector. 167 basic health centers (6 
percent of total) and 6 hospitals. 
• Increase in imports is around 1.5 million USD; impact on treasury is estimated to 
be around 3.4 million USD. 
• Damages to 1255 community nutrition sites, around 1.8 million USD. 
• Housing sector damages of 117.8 million USD and losses around 9.8 million 
USD, 89 percent in the private sector.  
 
Furthermore, in 2012 the cyclone events again resulted in substantial losses. During the 
2012 cyclone season, Madagascar was seriously affected by severe tropical cyclone 
Giovanna, which hit the island on the 14th of February, killing 26 people, affecting 
663,000 and displacing 133,000 (National Bureau for Risk and Disaster Management). 
Tropical storm Irina, starting on the 26th of February, brought heavy rains and caused 72 
deaths and resulted in the loss of homes of more than 70,000 people. 
 
General Macroeconomic Context  
 
Since the 1960s Madagascar experienced a relentless decline in per capita Gross 
Domestic Product with more or less only short periods of economic growth (Figure 7).  
 
 
Fig. 7: Per capita GDP from 1960 to 2010. Source: World Bank, 2012 
 
The decline and instability of growth was partly due to economic policies and high 
demographic growth (Pelissier and Sautter, 1994) as well as external shocks, such as 
cyclones and other bad weather events (Epstein et al., 2010). For a general discussion of 
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the political and economic situation in the past see also Thomas (2012). From an overall 
perspective, while Madagascar is a very poor country, it has enormous potential for 
development, not in the least due to the high level of literacy but also as it has enormous 
mineral wealth, natural beauty (important for tourism), and environmental treasures 
(Epstein et al., 2010). However, some obstacles – such as poor transportation 
infrastructure – do exist, but it seems that large shocks, absent extended repercussions, 
can be absorbed without major long-term effects, as the 2002 crisis has shown (for a 
detailed analysis see Hoftijzer and Paci, 2008).  
 
The current situation is more difficult. After years of political crisis, the fiscal situation 
seems to be under control. However, due to the limited option to utilize local and 
international financial markets, as well as limited additional fiscal revenues, the public 
investment program become almost marginal (Madagascar Economic Update, World 
Bank 2011). Continuing austerity kept the budget deficit to 1.3% of GDP in 2011 and  
about 1.6 percent in 2012 (Madagascar Finance Act 2012). Consumer price inflation was 
at 9.5% in 2011, mostly due to the increases in oil and food prices. The current account 
deficit decreased from 9.7% of GDP in 2010 to 3.4% in 2011 mostly because of revived 
goods exports and a drop in imports (which arose, however, from less economic activity). 
The deficit is expected to widen slightly to 4.4% in 2012 and 4.7% in 2013 with the 
gradual resumption of imports of goods as the political situation normalizes (African 
Economic Outlook, 2012). Today, the government contributes very little (5-8 percent) of 
total economic activities in the country through its direct expenses. International financial 
markets are nearly closed for Madagascar (except for some Chinese credit rating 
agencies, Madagascar is not rated by Moody’s or Standard & Poor). Also the domestic 
monetary and credit market is very small and it would be very difficult and economically 
dangerous for the government to get money there (see the example in the Madagascar 
Economic Update, World Bank 2011). 
 
Madagascar’s economy grew an estimated 1.0% in 2011, much more than 2010 (0.5%). 
This was driven mainly by the secondary sector (up 3.4% over 2010) and also the 
primary sector (up to 0.7%). The tertiary sector shrank by -0.3% because of poor 
agricultural output resulting from sparse rainfall and several cyclone events (Finance Act 
2012). In 2011, mining remained the economy’s chief strength and extractive industries 
grew 25.9% (African Economic Outlook 2012). The secondary sector’s best performers 
include tourism, which recovered in 2011 with a 14.8% rise in visitors. Overall 
investment fell to 14.9% of GDP in 2011 from 18.8% in 2010 mainly as a result of of less 
development aid and the end of the building and installation phases of big mining 
projects. The signing of a road-map agreement to end the political crisis on 17 September 
2011 and the vigorous mining sector should boost growth in 2012 and 2013. Foreign aid 
(which funds 70% of government investment) will likely not completely resume in 2012 
(African Economic Outlook, 2012). 
 
The 2012 budget continues the policy of rigor, with tax breaks to encourage investment 
in renewable energy. According to the African Economic Outlook (2012) foreign aid will 
not have returned, except to help pay for elections, so total revenue (including grants) is 
estimated at 12.4% of GDP and total spending at 13.7%. The deficit will be about the 
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same as 2011 (1.3% of GDP). Constitutional normality should be restored by 2013 and 
revenue increase to 13.1% of GDP and spending to 14.3%, with a budget deficit of 1.2% 
of GDP. The government plans to continue cautious fiscal and monetary policies that 
should bring inflation down to 8.3% in 2012 and 8.2% in 2013. Public debt is quite small. 
External debt was estimated in June 2011 at SDR 1 401.12 million (19.7% of GDP, down 
from 24.9% in 2010). Despite the crisis, the government has punctually paid its external 
debt interest, which was MGA 174.65 billion (USD 61.26 million) at the end of 2011 
(African Economic Outlook, 2012). 
 
Regarding education, with 74.3% net enrolment in 2010, the goal of universal education 
seems in reach, but poor quality teaching is a major problem. The primary school 
completion rate was 66% in 2010. Ministry budget restrictions caused pressure to the 
education system and increased the cost of education to families by 30%. About 400 000 
children were unable to enroll for the 2011-12 school year, and urban primary schools 
showed a 4.6% drop in enrolment in 2009-10 (African Economic Outlook, 2012). The 
importance of education for economic development should not be underestimated, as 
recent research has shown (Crespo and Lutz 2007; Lutz et al. 2007, 2008). 
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3. CatSim: A Step-wise Framework for Assessing and Developing 
Risk Management Strategies 
 
Given this background, this report will now lay out the methodology for systematically 
addressing how the government can assess and reduce the losses from cyclones, and how 
it can best prepare for providing relief and reconstruction in the event of a disaster. The 
model employed for this purpose is CatSim (Hochrainer, 2006; Mechler et al., 2006; 
Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2012), which allows policy makers to interactively view their 
country’s or region’s exposure to direct asset risks and (indirect) financial, fiscal and 
economic impacts of disaster scenarios. The policy outcomes for reducing disaster risk 
are assessed by the model and expressed with indicators of interest to policy makers, such 
as the budget stance, debt, and economic growth. Based on an assessment of their 
country’s or region’s vulnerability and risk, the main purpose of the tool is to assess 
policy options related to financial risk management, including investing in risk-transfer 
instruments (reserve funds, insurance and catastrophe bonds).  The model has a graphical 
user interface and is interactive (including a stand-alone application), that is, users can 
and should change the model parameters given different preferences and parameter 
uncertainty. For example, the user can adjust the amount of risk and debt the country is 
willing to take on, and the model will display how this changes the country’s 
vulnerability to disasters and how it affects different policy paths (see Hochrainer et al., 
2012).  
 
We begin by examining how the government can reduce its risks of experiencing a 
“resource or financing gap”, i.e. the inability to meet its post-disaster obligations in terms 
of repairing public infrastructure and providing needed relief to the private sector. For 
this purpose the government will need information on assessing financial and 
macroeconomic risks and vulnerability - Steps 1-4 of the following step-wise framework. 
Step 5 turns to the equally important question of how the government can reduce or 
mitigate human and economic losses, and Step 6 incorporates these considerations into a 
risk management framework. Figure 8 summarizes the steps to be taken in graphical 
format. 
 
Provided below are short descriptions of each of the 5 steps. More details will be given in 
subsequent relevant sections.  
 
• Step 1: Assessment of risks to public sector assets   
In developing a risk management strategy, it is important to understand the 
financial risks of asset losses and relief expenditure to assist households and 
business, and the proportion of financial losses that will be absorbed by the 
government. This risk depends on the frequency and intensity of cyclones, the 
assets exposed to the cyclone and their physical vulnerability. 
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Fig. 8: CatSim framework for developing a risk management strategy.  
Source: Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2012 
 
 
• Step 2: Estimation of the financial resilience of the public sector   
Given limited resources for reducing human and economic losses, the government 
must be financially resilient, or provide sufficient funds for financing 
reconstruction of public infrastructure and the provision of relief to households and 
the private sector. Financial resilience will, in turn, depend on how much the 
cyclone risk is reduced, thus affecting the general economic conditions of the 
country. 
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• Step 3: Assessment of the “resource gap”  
The resource gap is the difference between the contingent post-disaster liabilities 
of the government (for repairing infrastructure and providing relief to the private 
sector) and the sources of funding available to the government. It can be assessed 
by simulating the risks to public assets and estimating the government’s ability to 
cover these risks as well as provide private sector assistance. 
 
• Step 4: Mainstreaming disaster risk into development planning.   
Disaster risk is mainstreamed into national development planning by incorporating 
financial disaster risk and potential financing gaps for funding these losses into 
macroeconomic projections of the country. These consequences can be analyzed 
on variables such as economic growth or the country’s external debt situation. 
These indicators represent impacts on economic flows as compared to impacts on 
stocks addressed by the financial asset risk estimation. 
 
Risk management: evaluating pro-active strategies 
 
• Step 5: Assessment of government programs to reduce risks  
Naturally, the government is concerned primarily about loss of life from cyclones, 
and also about loss of livelihood and productive assets. As an important step in any 
risk management plan, it should consider the cost effectiveness of government 
programs to reduce human and economic losses.  
 
• Step 6: Assessment of pre-disaster insurance and other risk financing options 
There are several options the government can consider in proactively reducing its 
risk of a resource gap, including insurance, using catastrophe bonds, a reserve fund 
or contingent credit arrangements.  It is important to examine the cost effectiveness 
of these instruments in reducing the resource gap risk. 
 
Strategies can be developed and illustrated that reduce the risks of disasters and build the 
financial resilience of the public sector. The development of risk financing strategies has 
to be understood as an adaptive process, where measures are continuously revised after 
their impact on reducing financial vulnerability and risk has been assessed.  
 
With the exception of Step 5 (which is highly stylized in the model), the information 
needed will be consolidated by the CatSim model to give an overall picture of 
Madagascar’s cyclone risk, the options for mitigating this risk, the vulnerability of the 
government to a post-disaster resource gaps and its effects on macroeconomic indicators. 
In addition, the model will provide alternatives for reducing the government’s fiscal 
vulnerability to the cyclone risk.   
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4. Estimating the Potential Resource Gap and Macroeconomic Risk 
4.1 Step 1: Assessment of risks to public sector assets  
 
A single hazard analysis for cyclones is performed, based on the experience of the past 
losses due to this hazard (for an overall technical description how to estimate direct risk 
we refer to Appendix A1, detailed technical information on the approach used here is 
given in Appendix A2). Generally speaking, tropical cyclones are more frequent in the 
northern hemisphere (75 percent of the global total) than in the southern hemisphere 
(Gray, 1968). In the southern hemisphere, cyclones occur in three principal regions: 
 
• The Indian Ocean near Madagascar, where over 10% of the global total cyclones 
occur; 
• The oceanic area to the north-east and north-west of Australia; and, 
• The Gulf of Carpentaria. 
 
Figure 9 shows world cyclone tracks from 1842 - 2009. As one can see Madagascar is in 
one of the more active regions.  
 
 
Fig. 9: Cyclone tracks from 1849 to 2010 worldwide.  
Source: NOAA 2012 
 
To estimate the damage potential of cyclones, different techniques can be used, e.g. 
stochastic or engineering approaches for estimating physical vulnerability of the assets 
exposed (see Appendix A1 for a discussion how such an approach can be applied). 
However, as this kind of detailed information is not yet available, historical losses are 
used here for the direct risk assessment (see Appendix A2). There are two databases 
available that can be used for this analysis. One is the open-source EMDAT disaster 
database (EM-DAT, 2012) maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters at the Université Catholique de Louvain. EMDAT currently lists information 
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on people killed, made homeless, and affected as well as overall financial losses for more 
than 16,000 sudden-onset (such as floods, storms, earthquakes) and slow-onset (drought) 
events from 1900 to present. Data are compiled from various sources, including UN 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and 
press agencies.  
 
The second one is the newly produced time-series loss data by Malagasy officials based 
on the “Damage and losses assessment methodology” (from now on called MLoss 2012). 
It consists of past public sector loss estimates for the Analanjirofo region from 1980 to 
2012 separated into different sectorial impacts. Furthermore, the results for the 
Analanjirofo were upscaled to the national level by assuming the same exposure and 
vulnerability levels in other areas. Hence, one can expect in both datasets large 
uncertainties and therefore both will be used for the analysis to provide confidence 
intervals for the direct risk portion of analysis.  
 
We start with an explanation of the EMDAT dataset. Details on historic losses due to 
cyclones are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 3: Historical losses due to cyclones for Madagascar between 1960 to 2011.  
                    Source: EMDAT 2012. 
 
Year  Name  Fatalities Total Affected 
Total Damage (1000s)
(current USD) 
1968 Georgette   29 75000 3100
1969 Dany   81 43040 5000
1970 Jane   70 10000 11400
1972 Eugenie   91 2510056 12420
1975 Deborah & Ines   7 10050 0
1976    16 508876 17000
1977 Emilie   10 30000 350000
1978 Angele   70 18000 29000
1981    107 118000 250000
1982 Benedic, Electre, Frida, Justine   100 117000 250000
1983    42 13560 25000
1984 Kamisy   68 100215 250000
1986 Honorinina   99 84309 150000
1989 Alibera   46 55346 0
1991 Cynthia   36 250000 0
1994 Daisy, Geralda   200 540043 10000
1994 Nadya   12 8 200
1994 Litanne   0 0 0
1996 Bonita   9 100000 0
1997 Gretelle   140 600000 50000
1997 Josie   34 0 0
2000 Eline, Gloria   130 736937 9000
2000 Hudah   23 369272 0
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2002 Cyprien   2 1900 181
2002 Hary   1 0 0
2002 Kesiny   20 526200 0
2003 Fari   0 500 0
2003 Manou   89 162086 0
2003 Cela   0 164 0
2004 Elita   32 44290 0
2004 Galifo   363 988139 250000
2005 Ernest   78 7985 0
2006 Boloetse   3 6212 0
2006 Bondo   1 304 0
2007 Clovis   0 1460 0
2007 Indhala  80 215198 240000
2007 Jaya  3   0
2008 Fame  12 8613 0
2008 Ivan  93 524153 60000
2008 Jokwe    400 0
2009 Eric and Fanele  12 62505 0
2009 Izilda    3376 0
2009 Jade  15 64918 5000
2010 Hubert  120 192132 0
2011 Bingiza  35 115215 0
 
These losses are recalculated to constant 2000 prices and it is assumed that vulnerability 
(for example, crops or infrastructure susceptible to damage due to the hazard) remained 
constant over time (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Fig. 10: Cylone events in the past: Economic losses (1000’ USD, constant 2000) 
Source: Calculations based on EMDAT 2012 and World Bank 2012. 
22 
 
Assuming a stationary process for vulnerability and exposure over time is a strong 
assumption, which merits more attention and analysis. For example, cyclone intensity 
may change as shown in Figure 11 (see also the comments in the introductory section). 
Also, other variables, such as socio-economic and exposure changes would ideally be 
included so that the direct losses can be compared on the same scale. However, due to a 
limited amount of data, this was not possible (for a discussion of these issues and ways to 
avoid them see Appendix A2).  
 
 
Fig. 11: Intensities of cyclones from 1980 to 2006. 
Source: UN 2007. 
 
From a financial/fiscal perspective, total losses in a given year are important and thus in 
CatSim, annual losses are used as input parameters.  
 
The time series from 1960 to 2011 forms the basis for estimating a national level loss 
distribution function. In more detail, it is assumed that the losses belong to the maximum 
domain of attraction of an extreme value distribution and as losses are always a downside 
risk, we select the Frechet type distribution as the basic loss distribution. For estimating 
the shape as well as the location parameter, a non-linear optimization model was built, 
which best fits the curve with the data at hand (see Appendix A2). Furthermore, to 
increase the robustness of the results, other models - such as the Generalized Pareto 
model - were tested and improved in a step-based manner to satisfactory levels (based on 
graphical tests such as P-P plots and Q-Q plots, see Embrechts et al. 1997 for more 
information on these techniques). The parameters obtained with this method are used to 
calculate annual loss return periods.  
 
The same approach was used for the MLoss dataset. This dataset includes losses of the 
public sector, which are separated into different dimensions including damages to 
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schools, hospitals, the telecommunications system, the environment, and transportation 
from 1980 to 2012 (see Figure 12).  
 
 
 
Fig. 12: Public Sector Losses due to Cyclone events 1980-2012. 
Source: MLoss 2012. 
 
Unfortunately, comparison with the EM-DAT data revealed a small correlation between 
the two datasets (loss events) and it is unclear which one estimates the past losses more 
accurately. Hence, both will be used in the analysis. However, in one regard the MLoss 
data is superior compared to the EMDAT dataset, as it also shows the distribution of 
damages to different sections, which is important information for the policy-making 
process as it can be used to tackle specific loss financing questions. The next pie chart 
shows the average percentage of sectorial losses. 
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Fig. 13: Percentage of total public sector losses according to different dimensions. 
Source: MLoss 2012. 
 
As one can see, transportation and environmental losses as well as losses in buildings 
represent the largest share (more than 80 percent). However, important long-term growth 
related dimensions such as education (schools) might be substantially affected as well. 
Appendix 2 summarizes the different datasets available and also presents all the results 
found with the estimation procedure already explained. After careful analysis and 
comparisons with single hazard occurrences (e.g. based on the World Bank 2008 study) 
the following direct risk estimates were used. First, for the (current) public sector risk a 
Generalized Pareto (GP) distribution is estimated based on the MLoss dataset. Table 4 
shows the losses for selected return periods. 
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Table 4: Estimated loss return periods for public sector cyclone risk. 
 
Annual Return 
Periods 
Losses (constant 2000)  
million USD, public sector only 
20 149.0
50 204.2
80 232.5
100 245.9
150 270.4
200 287.7
250 301.1
300 312.1
400 329.4
500 342.9
Source: Own calculations 
 
The probability of first loss was estimated to be around 0.406, meaning that the public 
sector has a 40 percent probability of experiencing a loss every year (translating to an 
expected loss every 2 to 3 years). For the macroeconomic risk assessment step, private 
sector losses are needed, necessitating the use of the EMDAT database as well as other 
constructed datasets (see Appendix 2). Table 5 provides the results. 
 
Table 5: Estimated loss return periods for total (private and public) cyclone risk based 
on different estimation methods.  
 
 Losses (constant 2000)  
million USD, total losses 
Dataset Menages EMDAT PP 
Model GEV GEV GP 
 Maximum Baseline Minimum 
PFL 0.406 0.607 0.406 
20 5311.5 228.6 745.2 
50 7982.7 819.9 1021.1 
80 9547.7 1550.6 1162.7 
100 10344.0 2093.8 1229.9 
150 11886.4 3604.8 1352.0 
200 13061.1 5292.8 1438.6 
250 14021.4 7125.7 1505.8 
300 14839.4 9082.6 1560.7 
400 16195.0 13314.9 1647.4 
500 17303.6 17908.9 1714.6 
Source: Own calculations 
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As can be seen, the losses increase sharply with higher return periods. All of the 
estimates in Table 5 show larger values compared to the MLoss estimates. In fact, (see 
Appendix 2) the public sector loss estimates do not show fat tail behavior and therefore 
likely underestimate the risk. The probability of first loss using the EMDAT data is 
estimated to be 0.607, which means that Madagascar could expect monetary losses due to 
cyclone events more than every second year. The magnitude of losses is characterized by 
the Exceedance Probability curve that the return periods are based on (see Appendix A2). 
Given this probability-loss relationship, the next task is to estimate how much of the 
losses the government is responsible to finance, i.e. its contingent liabilities. 
 
Government exposure:  Contingent public liabilities 
 
To set the stage, the table below introduces the concept of explicit and implicit as well as 
direct and contingent liabilities (see Schick and Polackova 2004). In the case of cyclone 
risk, obligations will only occur if the event causes damages, hence the liabilities are 
contingent. The proportion of damages the government is responsible to finance depends 
not only on its own public assets but also can depend on implicit obligations.  
 
Liabilities Direct 
Obligation in any event 
Contingent 
Obligation if a particular event 
occurs 
Explicit                  
Government liability 
recognized by law or 
contract 
Foreign and domestic 
sovereign borrowing, 
expenditure 
by budget law  
State guarantees for non-sovereign 
borrowing and public and private 
sector entities, reconstruction of 
public infrastructure and assets  
 
 
Implicit                             
A moral obligation of the 
government 
 
Future recurrent costs of 
public investment 
projects, pension and 
health care expenditure 
 
Default of subnational government 
and public or private entities, 
disaster relief to affected 
households and business 
Source: Schick and Polackova 2004 
 
For example, in many cases market forces are unlikely to generate an adequate adaptation 
to disaster risks, broadly because of uncertainty and imperfect information, missing and 
misaligned markets but also financial constraints (Stern 2011). In case of a disaster event, 
consequently, there may be substantial contingent liabilities as identified above. 
 
We start with the following assumptions. If a disaster strikes, the government of 
Madagascar will take responsibility for the following:  
 
• Reconstruction of public assets: roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc; 
• Support to private households and businesses for relief and reconstruction; 
• Provision of relief to the poor; 
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As shown in Table 6, the values at risk for which the government is liable (contingent 
liabilities) are approximated at 27.3 billion USD. The calculation is made as follows: 
Because little information is available on public sector capital stock in Madagascar, it is 
assumed that approximately 30% of the total stock is public (this is in line with global 
averages). Since 77 percent of the population of Madagascar is poor, the government is 
assumed to absorb a large extra burden in the case of a cyclone (INSTAT 2011). 
Consistent with average figures (see Freeman et al. 2002; Hochrainer and Mechler 2012) 
it is further assumed that the government will have to spend an amount equivalent to 
another 20% of the total stock losses to provide relief. For an estimated total capital stock 
of USD 54.8 billion (see Appendix A3) the maximum contingent liabilities of the 
government of Madagascar is therefore around 27.3 billion USD if both public assets as 
well as private sector relief is assumed.  
  
Table 6: Value of elements exposed to risk 
Type USD billion  
(constant 2000 
prices) 
Private capital 38.4 
Public capital 16.4 
Total capital 54.8 
Relief spending 10.9 
Government contingent liabilities  
(public assets and assistance to private sector 
and households) 
27.3 
 
If the government decides to exclude any implicit liabilities then this number (27.3 billion 
USD) would go down to 16.4 billion USD. Different assumptions about what kind of 
liabilities the government is responsible for can be tested within CatSim (see also the 
CatSim Guidelines) 
 
Financial risk in probabilistic terms 
 
Based on the information above, the probabilistic losses due to cyclones in terms of 
percent of capital stock loss are estimated for Madagascar. The following table shows 
four data points on the probability distribution for cyclone risk. Combined with assets at 
risk (exposure), the probabilistic absolute losses to the government are calculated and 
shown in Table 7 (only baseline case shown here). 
 
Table 7: Potential cyclone losses  
 Total financial losses 
in % of GDP 
Government financial losses 
million USD  
20-year event loss  4.54 % 114.3 
50-year event loss   16.31 % 409.95 
100-year event loss  41.65 % 1046.7 
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Total potential losses for the government, with an annual probability of five percent of 
being exceeded (a 20 year event), is assessed at currently approximately USD 114.3 
million. The 50-, 100- and 500-year events would cause losses of about USD 409, 1047 
and 8954 million, respectively. This information can be expressed in terms of an 
exceedance loss distribution (EP) (see Appendix A2) as shown in Figure 14 (see also 
Appendix 6 for the case of multi risk situations). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Loss exceedance distribution 
 
An important summary measure of this probability distribution is the annual expected 
losses, or the losses to be expected on average every year. The annual expected loss is the 
sum of all losses weighted by the probability of occurrence. Graphically, the expected 
losses are represented by the area below the exceedance distribution. For the public sector 
only, modeled annual losses are on average around 10.48 million USD with a standard 
deviation of 39 million USD. For the baseline model annual average losses are around 55 
million with a standard deviation of 253 million USD. The minimum baseline case gives 
annual expected losses of around 26 million USD with a standard deviation of 98 million 
USD. Integrating the curve for the maximum case, losses are very high, with average 
annual losses estimated to be around 213 million USD and a standard deviation of about 
787 million USD. Table 8 summarizes the results.  
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Table 8: Annual expected losses and corresponding standard deviations for selected models 
Model Annual expected loss 
(million USD) 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Public sector only 10.48 39  
Baseline case 55 253  
Minimum case 26 98  
Maximum case 213 787  
    
 
As said, the public sector only model gives the lowest number and is calculated to be 
around 10 million USD, or in other words, the government of Madagascar could expect 
to be responsible for cyclone loss financing of around 10 million USD every year. Bear in 
mind that disasters are not average, but extreme events occurring very rarely. Over a 
longer time period, like 100 or 500 years, catastrophe losses suffered will be close to the 
sum of annual expected losses over these years, but large shocks could occur anytime and 
therefore necessitate the modeling of potential consequences of these shocks. 
4.2 Step 2: Estimation of the financial resilience of the public sector 
 
After identifying and assessing financial disaster risks, the next step is to determine the 
government’s ability to finance the potential losses should the disaster occur in the 
current period. In general, governments can make use of the following ex ante (before the 
event) and ex post (after the event) financing sources. 
 
Ex post financing sources 
 
The government can raise funds after a disaster by:  
• accessing international assistance,  
• diverting funds from other budget items,  
• imposing or raising taxes,  
• taking a credit from the Central Bank (which either prints money or depletes its 
foreign currency reserves),  
• borrowing by issuing domestic bonds, and 
• borrowing from multilateral finance institutions (MFIs) and issuing bonds on the 
international market.  
 
Each of these sources of financing is characterized by costs to the government as well as 
factors that constrain its availability. A methodology was developed for estimating the 
costs and availability of these sources, and these data serve as inputs to CatSim 
(Hochrainer, 2006; Mechler et al. 2006). More detail on the calculation of these sources 
can be found in the guidelines (see also Appendix A4) 
 
Ex ante financing sources 
 
The government can arrange for financing before a disaster occurs. Ex-ante options 
comprise insurance (traditional or alternative, e.g. catastrophe bonds), reserve funds or 
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arranging a contingent credit (the payment of an annual fee for the option of securing a 
loan with pre-arranged conditions after a disaster). Ex ante financing may also include 
premiums paid into an insurance pool. These ex-ante options involve annual payments or 
opportunity costs that can be substantial. Furthermore, benefits in terms of claim 
payments arise only if an event happens.  
 
Assessment of feasible financing sources for Madagascar 
 
An understanding of the sources for financing a disaster in Madagascar, including the 
costs and constraints, is crucial for planning a disaster risk management strategy.  
 
Concerning ex-post sources, Madagascar is constrained by its fiscal inflexibility and low 
revenue base: it is assumed that domestic credit is available up to approximately USD 50 
million (a very optimistic assumption, see also Madagascar Economic Update 2011). 
Diversion from the budget is not feasible to a large extent; however, we assume 0.1% of 
the budget can be diverted. Furthermore, we assume 10.4 percent of the total losses will 
be financed by outside assistance; this is based on some past loss financing assistance 
estimations in other countries (see Freeman et al. 2002ab). 
 
Table 9: Sources for financing of disaster losses 
 
Source Parameter value used 
International donor 
assistance 
10.4 % 
Diversion from budget 0.1% 
Domestic bonds and 
credit 
50 million USD 
Multilateral borrowing 20 million USD 
Reserve fund 0 million USD 
International borrowing 20 million USD 
 
Alternatively, due to low debt, borrowing from multilateral and international sources is 
assumed to be possible (in a worst case scenario, there are some Chinese Banks who 
actually give a credit rating for Madagascar). We estimate post-disaster loans to be 
possible to approximately USD 40 million with an equal split from multilateral and 
international sources but at different interest rates and conditions. The sources are 
summarized in Table 9 above (these parameters form the baseline for discussion and 
were discussed and assessed during the workshop). It should be also noted that these are 
very optimistic assumptions and therefore should treated with caution (however, the 
options were assessed at the workshop and generally accepted; if they should be changed 
in the future within CatSim, the manual from Hochrainer 2012 should be consulted). 
4.3 Step 3:  Estimating the government’s “financing gap” 
 
Summarizing all potential sources, CatSim can provide an estimate of the government’s 
financing gap for its cyclone exposure. Given the assumptions and data as described 
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above, the cyclone risk financing gap for Madagascar’s government using the baseline 
case is shown in Figure 14.   
 
 
 
Fig. 15: Financial vulnerability and resource gap 
 
Note, that Madagascar experiences difficulties in raising sufficient funding for the 23-
year event. The chart in Figure 14 shows total financing needs and financing available for 
different year events. Keeping in mind the data limitations and restrictive assumptions, 
this analysis shows that the government of Madagascar has sufficient financing available 
up to the 23 year cyclone-related loss event. However, for less frequent and more severe 
events a gap would occur, e.g. for a 100 year event, this gap would amount to US$ 0.95 
billion. What this means for long term consequences is assessed in the next section.  
 
In Table 10, the financing gap year event as well as the corresponding gap for a 100 year 
event loss is shown. 
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Table 10: Financing Gap return period and 100 year gap (billion USD).  
 
 Model 
 Maximum Baseline Minimum Public  
 
Financing Gap 
Year Event 
 
1 23 4 24 
100 year gap 
 
5.71 0.95 
 
0.547 0.09 
Source: Own calculations 
 
The financing gap year event is similar for the “public sector only” as well as the 
“baseline” model runs. However, as the former does not have a fat tail (it actually does 
not increase very steeply), losses for more extreme events are significantly lower as can 
be seen if compared to the 100 year event gap. Even with very optimistic loss financing 
assumptions one can expect higher losses for more extreme events. On the other hand, 
using the maximum and minimum bounds losses are estimated to be very high and nearly 
always causing financing problems and a 100 year event gap of about 5.71 billion.  It also 
should be noted that while the minimum model here has lower values than the baseline, 
this is not the case for the higher year events (see Table 11).  
 
Summarizing, in the baseline case scenario it was found that a financing gap year event 
would start around the 23-24 year event. Losses from more extreme events such as the 
100 year event loss will be very difficult to be financed and could cause gaps around the 
1 billion USD threshold. It should be noted that confidence bounds around these 
estimates are large. In one of the models, the financing gap year event would actually 
approach 1, meaning that the government of Madagascar cannot finance any losses 
whatsoever and extremes can cause heavy damages where a large portion cannot be 
financed. It should also be noted that if the financing resources were less optimistic than 
used here, the baseline results would decrease vastly. For example, without the option to 
divert funding from the budget, the financing gap would start at the 7 year event. 
Additional tests (see the calibration chapter 7 in Hochrainer 2012) can be performed for 
sensitivity analysis but the financing gap would remain in an area around the 10 to 20 
year event.  
 
4.4 Step 4: Mainstreaming disaster risk into macroeconomic and development 
planning 
 
Information on the financial losses from cyclones and the resource/financing gap is 
helpful, but ultimately the implications of this gap on economic development and other 
“flow variables” are of major interest when mainstreaming disaster risks into 
development planning and macroeconomic management. For that matter, financial risk, 
financial vulnerability and the prevalent economic conditions in Madagascar are 
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combined in order to derive an estimate of potential fiscal and macroeconomic impacts. 
As disaster events are probabilistic events, the full information contained in the 
probabilistic loss curve can be used for simulating economic growth trajectories. Figure 
16 and 17 show a selection of trajectories for fiscal and macroeconomic impacts for 
Madagascar. In Figure 16, potential trajectories for the discretionary portion of the budget 
are outlined. This indicator may be useful as it represents budget flexibility after 
mainstreaming disaster losses and government relief requirements. The graph shows that 
while on average, budget flexibility should increase, there is some potential for disasters 
seriously affecting budget flexibility. 
 
 
 
Fig. 16: Potential fiscal impacts due to disaster impacts 
 
Similarly, macroeconomic performance may be affected. In Figure 17 the economy 
grows over time as investment adds to the capital stock. However, in a number of cases 
disasters cause a loss of assets and income. Given the financial resilience of the 
government, these events put the economy on a lower trajectory. In some cases, there is a 
dramatic decrease in economic activity. 
 
34 
 
 
 
Fig. 17: Potential GDP impacts due to disaster impacts 
 
The occurrence of such trajectories is stochastic and depends on the probability 
distribution of financial losses. Normally, 5,000 or 10,000 trajectories are calculated, but 
in this chart only 2000 are summarized for illustration purposes. These trajectories do not 
have equal probability: the cases with economic growth proceeding as planned (the 
trajectories in the upper part) have a higher probability than the catastrophic cases at the 
bottom. Such an assessment illustrates the worst outcomes compared to the planned 
business-as-usual cases of economic development. Table 11 presents the financing gap 
probability for the next 5 years as well as the credit buffer drop for the baseline, 
maximum and minimum models (the public sector only model can no longer be used, as 
private sector losses need to be incorporated). The credit buffer drop is defined as the 
average drop over the next 5 years from the starting level (here defined to be 40 million 
USD). A decrease of the credit buffer indicates high indebtedness and no possibilities to 
borrow in the future.  
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Table 11: Financing Gap probability and credit buffer drop  (million USD).  
 
 Model 
 Maximum Baseline Minimum 
 
Probability of 
Financing Gap (%) 
 
93 48 89 
Credit buffer drop 
million USD 
39 32 36 
Source: Own calculations 
 
For the baseline model, the probability of having a financing gap in the next 5 years is 48 
percent. For the other two models it is between 89 and 93 percent, i.e. financing problems 
will emerge in the future with near certainty. Additionally, indebtedness will likely 
increase as well; while it is estimated that around 40 million USD of credits could 
currently be taken from international markets, this amount would decrease to less than 8 
million (baseline case) or near zero. Hence, even in the case that losses can be financed 
sporadically in the short term via credits, this kind of option is decreasing over the long 
term, making it difficult in the future to have creditworthiness. It is now the question 
what kind of instruments or options could be chosen to decrease this kind of risk, which 
is discussed in the next section. 
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5.  Risk Management: Evaluating Proactive Risk Reduction and   
Risk Financing Strategies 
 
After identifying and assessing risks and the financing gap, the next step in a risk 
management process is to evaluate the state of risk reduction and risk transfer measures. 
As shown in Figure 18, risk reduction, mitigation and preparedness reduce losses, 
whereas risk financing transfers and shares [residual] risks. The capacity of a government 
to proactively manage its risks with mitigation and financing options depends to a large 
degree on its risk management and governance institutions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 18: Disaster risk management cycle 
 
Possible risk financing instruments could include insurance-type arrangements (such as  
insurance, reserve funds or contingent credit arrangements), shortly discussed below. 
 
• Insurance and other forms of risk transfer provide indemnification against losses in 
exchange for a premium payment. The most common forms of risk transfer are 
insurance or reinsurance. Alternatively, catastrophe bonds can be used to access 
capital of the international financial markets.   
• A reserve fund holds liquid capital to be used in the event of a disaster. Normally, the 
fund is financed on an annual basis, so that capital can accumulate. A fund 
accumulates in years without catastrophes and can be used in the case of an event to 
finance the losses. 
• Contingent credit arrangements do not transfer risk, but spread it intertemporally. In 
exchange for an annual fee, the right is obtained to take out a specific loan amount 
post-event that has to be repaid at contractually fixed conditions. Contingent credit 
options are commonly grouped under alternative risk transfer instruments. 
 
All of these instruments have its pros and cons summarized in Table 12 below. 
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Table 12: Pros and cons of ex-ante financing instruments 
 Insurance Reserve fund Contingent credit 
Cost before 
event 
Premium multiplied by 
number of years before 
event 
Payment into fund 
multiplied by number of 
years before event 
Holding fee multiplied 
by number of years 
before event 
Benefit after 
event 
• Loss indemnification 
for elements insured 
• Increased capital 
inflows from abroad to 
affected economy 
• Reserve funds and 
interest available 
• Funds will not be lost 
in case of no event 
• Funds available 
immediately  
• Increased capital 
inflows from abroad to 
affected economy 
Cost after event None None to the extent that 
enough reserve has been 
accumulated 
Additional debt service, 
reduction in ability to 
take out future debt 
Incentive for 
mitigation? 
Yes Only if risk is known No 
Risks Risk of (re)insurer 
insolvency 
? Risk of depletion 
before disaster events 
due to political 
pressures 
? Risk of insufficient 
funds 
• Risk of insufficient 
funds 
• Risk of financial entity 
insolvency 
Source: Mechler, 2004.  
 
Figure 19 presents a flow diagram as a summary of how each of the steps could be 
performed in a practical way over time. The first step is to identify hazards the country is 
exposed to. Then, risks are evaluated to determine if they are acceptable.  
 
 
 
Fig. 19: Planning for disaster risks. Source: Bettencourt et al., 2006 
 
38 
 
If not, one has to think about possible risk management strategies including top-down as 
well as bottom-up approaches. At the end, programs and projects should be started (on 
various levels) to decrease the risk to an acceptable level. Afterwards, monitoring should 
be undertaken on a continuous (annual) basis 
 
Summarizing, disaster risk management consists of measures taken before, during and 
after the disaster event to either reduce the extent of the hazard, exposure of the elements 
at risk and/or vulnerability (Lindell and Perry 2004). These measures can usefully be 
divided into risk-reduction (mitigation) instruments and risk-financing instruments. The 
former, such as levees to protect against floods or strengthening roofs against cyclone 
events, reduce direct hazard impacts, and the latter reduces the financial impacts. In 
addition, or alternatively, one can invest in insurance and other types of risk-financing 
measures to assure that sufficient resources are available after the event for timely relief 
and reconstruction. This reduces indirect “downstream” losses. 
 
However, the choice between how much should be invested in risk reduction versus risk 
financing is not straightforward. Such a selection will depend primarily on the occurrence 
probability of the hazard, the associated size of impacts, the costs and benefits of both 
types of instruments, as well as on their interaction. Risk-reduction measures against 
direct losses are usually more cost effective for frequent events (say 10 to 100-year loss 
return period) with low to medium-sized losses than for high impact/less frequent events. 
For lower impact events substantial reduction in damage can typically be achieved at 
relatively little expenditure, but it becomes increasingly costly to achieve further 
reductions in risk (Rescher 1983).  
 
Concerning risk financing, risk bearers (individuals, businesses, governments) are 
generally better able to finance lower consequence events from their own means, 
including savings, reserve funds or credit arrangements. Risk financing is thus generally 
more appropriate for medium sized to extreme losses (say 100- to 500-year loss events) 
to smoothen the variability of financial losses. Finally, some events (say above the 500-
year loss event) can be too costly to be reduced or insured. Hence, outside assistance may 
be needed (e.g. from the government, international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, donations, etc.). 
 
If investments in risk reduction are more cost effective for low-consequence events, 
and investments in insurance more cost effective for high-consequence events, how 
would this translate into cyclone adaptation measures?  Below (Figure 20) we present a 
hypothetical illustrative example of how a risk layering approach can provide insights on 
adaptation investments Madagascar.  
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Fig. 20:  Efficiency of risk management instruments and occurrence probability.  
                   Source: Hochrainer-Stigler and Pflug, 2012. 
 
 
The financing gap year event was estimated to be between the 10 to 23 year events, so 
according to Figure 20 risk reduction should be the primary focus. On the other hand, 
financial pressure to the fiscal system and indebtedness level can be expected in the 
future as the probability of a financing gap was between 50 and 90 percent, with a drop in 
credit availability of nearly 80 to 100 percent. Hence, a range of financial instruments 
should also be contemplated. Unfortunately, the macroeconomic situation is very difficult 
currently; draining resources from other development and growth projects may result in 
important opportunity costs. These tradeoffs could affect transportation, usually seen as 
not the engine but the wheels of economic growth, and education, with an importance for 
development that cannot be overestimated (World Bank 2003, Lutz et al. 2012). 
 
Figure 21 shows the resulting decrease in the probability of a financing gap for the next 5 
years, given implementation of different options. While the expenditure as percent of 
available budget is shown from 0 to 80 percent (x-axis) one should recognize that only 1 
to 2 percent could be actually used in the most optimistic setting.  
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Fig. 21: Decrease of the financing gap probability using different instruments  
                    
For example, using 2 percent of the discretionary budget over the next 5 years would 
decrease the probability of a gap from 43 to around 22 and 31 percent. However, looking 
at the credit buffer drop, values did not change significantly, which indicates that most of 
the losses would have to be financed through credits. This is further reflected in the 
yellow line, which represents the contingent credit option. While it is beneficial to obtain 
easy and cheap credits after a disaster event, one still has to repay the loan and therefore 
is more financially vulnerable during this period than with other options. Furthermore, 
one should not forget the trade-off between stability and growth. Investing 2 percent of 
the discretionary budget into risk management options would decrease GDP by half a 
billion over the next 5 years due to less possibilities to invest in growth. 
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6. Group Exercise during Workshop and Training Day 
 
Your task is to evaluate options for reducing and transferring disaster risk based on 
available information on your country’s disaster risk profile, its fiscal position, 
development plans, institutional capacity and development agenda/plans. You are 
charged thus with giving guidance to your government on strategy and public 
investments in pro-active disaster risk management. Specifically, your group is asked to: 
 
1. Develop an integrated risk management and financing strategy that includes 
judgments on what losses the public sector will bear; of this, define how much will be 
absorbed, where/how much you will invest to reduce risk, and select mechanisms for 
financing remaining contingent liability for ex-post reconstruction (savings/funds, 
reorienting budget and existing credit; contingent debt, insurance, etc.). 
 
2. Identify next steps (action plan) to implement the integrated risk management and 
financing strategy: budget instructions (debt, budget caps, capital investments, 
allocations to ministries/sectors and subnationals etc.); tools for identifying and 
reducing risk in the annual public investment program; necessary steps to improve the 
prudent use of private insurance; any additional risk evaluations needed, such as 
identification of critical facilities, infrastructure and populations at high risk. 
 
Please use the information available above in combination with CatSim, which provides 
you with information on the following themes:  
 
• Background information on Madagascar and its exposure to natural hazards, 
including its public investment program and development agenda, 
• The government’s contingent liabilities, including relief to victims and 
reconstruction of private assets, 
• The government’s fiscal profile (budget, debt, etc.),  
• The macroeconomic and fiscal risk to the country,  
• Options for physical risk reduction (loss mitigation) measures, including their 
benefits and costs, 
• Options for transferring risk from the public sector and thus better enabling the 
government to meet its post-disaster liabilities. 
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7. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
Madagascar has one of the highest cyclone risks worldwide, especially the east coast, 
which is located in the path of destructive cyclones coming from the Indian Ocean. 
Furthermore, it is projected that climate change will increase the intensity of cyclones in 
the future, while decreasing their frequency.  The purpose of this report and the exercise 
in the workshop was to discuss and apply the CatSim (Catastrophe Simulation) approach 
to incorporate disaster risk management (DRM) into fiscal and development planning 
processes, as well as exploring the feasibility of using disaster risk management options 
for reducing risk. Additionally, it should support the ongoing CPGU (Cellule de 
prevention et gestion des urgencies) led-study on “Mainstreaming Disaster Risk 
Management and Climate Change in Economic Development”.  
 
Based on two datasets, ie. EMDAT and MLoss, different estimates of direct risk were 
estimated. Dependent on the model used, average annual losses the government is 
responsible for were estimated to be between 10 million USD and 55 million USD. 
Corresponding standard deviations were found to be large and therefore should not be 
neglected.  For example, using the public sector loss estimates from MLoss, average 
annual losses were found to be 10.48 million with a standard deviation of 39 million 
USD; for loss estimates based on the EMDAT database average annual losses were about 
55 million USD with a standard deviation of 253 million USD.   
 
Including the financial resources of the government to finance losses due to cyclone 
events, it was found that the government would experience difficulties in raising 
sufficient funding after a 23-year loss event. For less frequent and more severe events, a 
financing gap would occur, e.g. for a 100 year event, this gap would amount to US$ 0.95 
billion.  Hence, losses from more extreme events such as the 100 year event loss would 
be very difficult to finance and could cause gaps around the 1 billion USD threshold 
level. It should be noted that confidence bounds around these estimates are large, 
especially if financing resources are less optimistic than used here. Additional sensitivity 
tests were performed and it was concluded that the financing gap would be between the 
10 to 25 year loss events.  
 
Regarding long-term consequences, for the baseline model the probability of having a 
financing gap in the next 5 years was 48 percent. For the other two models it was 
between 89 and 93 percent, i.e. financing problems will emerge in the future with near 
certainty. Additionally, indebtedness will likely increase; while currently it is estimated 
that around 40 million USD of credits could be taken from international markets, this 
amount would decrease to less than 8 million (baseline case) or near zero. Hence, even in 
the case that losses can be financed sporadically in the short term via credits, this kind of 
option is decreasing over the long term, making it difficult in the future to have 
creditworthiness.  
 
This raised the question of what kind of instruments or options could be chosen to 
decrease this kind of risk. Unfortunately, the macroeconomic situation in Madagascar is 
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very difficult currently and draining resources from other development and growth 
projects may cause important opportunity costs. For example, using 2 percent of the 
discretionary budget over the next 5 years would decrease the probability of a financing 
gap from 43 to around 22 and 31 percent. However, indebtedness levels would remain 
high, which indicates that most of the losses need to be financed through credits. 
Furthermore, one must not forget the trade-off between stability and growth. Investing 2 
percent of the discretionary budget into risk management options would decrease GDP by 
half a billion over the next 5 years due to less investment in growth projects.  
 
It was discussed via the risk layer approach that for frequent events, risk reduction is 
more appropriate and for less frequent events risk financing (such as an insurance or a 
contingency fund) is more effective. As the financing gap is still at least below the 50 
year return level, it therefore seems better to focus on risk reduction options first (such as 
the GFDRR supported development of cyclone-resistant national building codes). 
Afterwards, risk financing options should be contemplated. As said, infrastructure is 
usually seen as “if not the engine then the wheels of economic activity” (World Bank 
1993) and education and its importance for development cannot be overestimated (Lutz et 
al. 2008). Hence, focus on such dimensions seems superior. Two possible instruments 
which showed some success in the past in this regard will be discussed briefly next, e.g. 
the Mexican FONDEN and the Caribbean insurance initiative.  
 
The 1985 earthquake in Mexico City sensitized Mexican authorities to the benefits of 
proactively engaging in prevention and financial disaster risk management. Nearly 9,000 
people lost their lives, and direct economic losses from this disaster were estimated at $7 
billion (in 2006 $) or 2.7% of the GDP in the year of the event (Cardenas et al., 2007). 
Colossal expenses on rehabilitation and reconstruction resulted in an increase in the fiscal 
deficit of $1.9 billion over the next four years. Despite inflows from private sector 
(business and households) insurance and foreign donations, the earthquake is estimated to 
have had a negative effect of $8.6 billion on Mexico’s balance of payments over this 
period (Jovel, 1989). In 1996 the national government created a budgetary program called 
FONDEN (Fund For Natural Disasters) to enhance the country’s financial preparedness 
for natural disaster losses. As a budgetary item FONDEN is established at the start of 
each fiscal year by the Mexican parliament as part of the federal government budget plan. 
FONDEN provides last-resort funding for uninsurable losses, such as emergency 
response and disaster relief. In addition to the budgetary program, in 1999 a reserve trust 
fund was created, which is filled by the surplus of the previous year budget item. 
FONDEN’s objective is to prevent imbalances in the federal government finances 
derived from outlays caused by natural catastrophes. The fund does not support 
reconstruction of private infrastructure, nor does it act as insurer of last resort. It grants 
financial support only to those private individuals that, due to their poverty status, require 
government assistance. Figure 22 shows FONDEN’s budgeted and spent funds for 
natural disasters over the last decade, including the average balance and one standard 
deviation around this mean. 
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Fig. 22: Budget and resources of FONDEN. Source: Ministry of Finance and Public 
Credit of Mexico, Cardenas et al. 2007 
 
As shown in Figure 22, budgeted FONDEN resources have been declining over the last 
few years. Moreover, demands on FONDEN’s resources are volatile, and outlays have 
often exceeded budgeted funds. As a consequence the reserve fund has diminished, and 
finally in 2005, after the severe hurricane season affecting large parts of coastal Mexico, 
the fund was exhausted. The uncertainty associated with FONDEN to provide sufficient 
post-disaster finance led officials of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (hereafter 
referred to as the Finance Ministry) to consider hedging against natural disaster shocks 
(see Cardenas et al. 2007). A similar contingency fund could be also a possibility for 
Madagascar. However, as said, the opportunity costs of such instruments should not be 
neglected. As seen with the Mexican disaster fund, in the due course of its development 
over time (Figure 22), the necessary kind of financing needs and capital requirements 
became clearer. 
 
Pooling extreme risk deserves special attention. If insurers with limited capital reserves 
choose to indemnify large covariant risks (losses occurring at the same place/time), they 
must guard against insolvency by diversifying their portfolios, limiting exposure and/or 
transferring their risks to the global reinsurance and financial markets. Yet, due to lack of 
access to the reinsurance markets and the high cost, many insurers are operating with 
little financial backup arrangements. This is not a problem for small pilot schemes, but 
raises a question of viability when scaling up. Similarly, developing country 
governments, particularly those of small states, pay international prices that are subject to 
fluctuations caused elsewhere. For example, Barbados, which is one of few countries 
insuring public infrastructure, experienced a ten-fold increase in insurance premium after 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 despite the fact that Barbados is not in a major hurricane path. 
A promising strategy to more effectively diversify risks is through intergovernmental risk 
pooling arrangements.  
 
Caribbean island states in 2007 formed the world’s first multi-country catastrophe 
insurance pool to provide governments with immediate liquidity in the aftermath of 
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hurricanes or earthquakes. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) 
went into operation in June 2007 with the participation of 16 Caribbean countries, whose 
governments contributed resources ranging from US$200 thousand to US$4 million 
depending on the exposure of their specific country to earthquakes and hurricanes. This 
pool is expected to result in a substantial reduction in premium cost of about 45 – 50% 
for the participating countries. The fund covers up to 20% of the estimated infrastructure 
loss, and claims will be paid depending on an index for hurricanes (wind speed) and 
earthquakes (ground shaking).  Initial funding by donor organizations provided support 
for start-up costs and helped capitalize the pool. The facility will transfer the risks it 
cannot retain to the international financial markets through reinsurance or through other 
financial instruments (for example, catastrophe bonds). The accumulation of reserves 
over time should lessen the facility’s dependence on outside risk transfer. Should the total 
insured losses exceed its claims-paying capacity, payouts will be pro-rated based on the 
total amount of expected claims compared to the remaining available funds. In addition, 
donors are adding to the reserves. The governments of Bermuda, Canada, France, the 
United Kingdom, as well as the Caribbean Development Bank and the World Bank 
recently pledged a total of US $47 million to the CCRIF reserve fund. Part of this funding 
is used to help low-income island states, such as Haiti, pay the requisite premium 
(Ghesquiere et al., 2006).  
 
There were clear advantages of pooling their risks, and thus diversifying across island 
states. Together governments can negotiate re-insurance terms for their pool at a 
significantly lower cost than if they were to purchase insurance separately in the financial 
markets. Early cash claim payment received after an event will help to overcome the 
typical post-disaster liquidity gap.  Such an option to pool risk together with other 
African states could be also a possibility for Madagascar. Again, due to the tight financial 
situation in Madagascar it is likely the case that opportunity costs will be high and 
therefore such options have to be assessed in the general context of economic 
development strategies for future economic growth.  
 
Apart from this more technical assessment of possible options it should also be 
emphasized that additional structures and institutions have to be built to mainstream 
disaster risk into sustainable development planning processes. This includes: 
 
• Catastrophe models (see Appendix 1) need detailed exposure and vulnerability 
data, which are not yet at hand. Hence, spatial assessments of critical 
infrastructures and other elements at risk as well as corresponding vulnerabilities 
have to be gathered in the future. 
 
• Frequent updates between different government ministries about the different 
information they have (for example in regards to the different steps of the CatSim 
approach) would be beneficial for the risk assessment and risk management 
process. For example, while the meteorological office could provide details about 
cyclone-exposed areas, other ministries could additionally provide their input to 
create vulnerability hotspots, i.e. where attention should be prioritized.  
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• As there is a substantial degree of uncertainty in estimates of disasters risks and 
financial vulnerability, it is important that other potential users have full 
participation in the design, estimation and use in the future. The stand alone 
application of CatSim with the accompanied manual should help in that regard.  
 
• Clearly, financial vulnerability of the public sector presents only one aspect, albeit 
an import one, of vulnerability to natural hazards.  However, other indicators are 
necessary in order to complement this concept. Hence, disaster risk management 
has to be understood within a general integrated concept to enhance socio-
economic development. It is especially important to also include qualitative data 
and objectives which are at hand, e.g. increase in school enrolment and quality of 
teaching etc. 
 
• It important to measure future cyclone events and its effects on society in as much 
detail as possible (such as the study of the Cyclone 2007/2008 season, World 
Bank 2008). This is not only needed for estimating the direct risk as discussed in 
this report but also will be very important in the future to calibrate catastrophe 
models. Additionally, it will be clearer what kind of emergency steps have to be 
taken first and what kind of recovery processes are most needed. 
 
• Finally, cyclone risks pose only one of the many challenges ahead. Hence, 
integrated approaches where other dimensions come into play should be 
considered as an appropriate way to derive sustainable decisions. Clearly, cyclone 
risk is only one part of the puzzle and needs to be integrated within a systems 
analysis.  
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9.  Appendix: Technical Notes 
Appendix A1: Assessing Disaster Risk: Approaches 
Common practice in catastrophe models is to conceptually model the direct damage 
calculations via three components, i.e. the “hazard”, “exposure” and “vulnerability” 
module. A fourth “loss” module summarizes the results from these modules with the help 
of risk metrics or loss distributions (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Loss distribution. Source: Hochrainer, 2006. 
 
Loss distributions are cumulative distribution functions where the x-axis represents the 
losses, e.g. monetary losses, annual losses in terms of GDP, or capital stock losses. The 
y-axis represents the probability that losses do not exceed a given level of damage. It 
therefore can be called the “event axis”. For example, in Figure 1, a value of 0.98 on the 
event axis means that with a probability of 98 percent the losses do not exceed a given 
level of damage, say x2. In other words, with a probability of 2 percent the losses will 
exceed this level of damage. Note that a 2 percent probability can be interpreted as a 
(1/0.02=) 50 year event, e.g. an event that happens on average once every 50 years. The 
same principle can be used for all other events. This means that the higher the return 
period, the lower the probability of the event, but the higher the losses. The loss 
distribution function itself is very useful for risk management purposes because various 
risk measures can be calculated from it (see Pflug and Römisch). For example,  
 
• the average annual loss, which is the area above the loss distribution  
• the Value at Risk (VaR) which is defined as VaR(p)=F-1(1-p), where F-1 is the 
quantile function defined as the inverse of the loss distribution function, or 
• the Probable Maximum Loss (PML) which is associated with a given probability 
of exceedance (see also Grossi and Kunreuther 2005).  
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Generally speaking, two approaches are available to estimate loss distributions, either via 
catastrophe modeling approaches or by using past events. Conceptually, as indicated 
above, four different modules in catastrophe models can be distinguished: Hazard, 
Exposure, Vulnerability and Loss (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Catastrophe Modeling Approach for Risk Assessment of Natural Hazards. Source: 
Based on Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005. 
 
The hazard model must incorporate at least three variables regarding the source 
parameters of the hazard: the location of future events, their frequency of occurrence and 
their severity. This information is based on either historical and/or engineering 
information, e.g. by simulating potential hurricane tracks to increase the number 
observations. The probability of a given event has to be determined either by time-series 
analysis or by assuming suitable stochastic models, e.g. a non-homogeneous Poisson 
distribution of the probability of a hurricane event. Furthermore, the intensity needs to be 
determined. For example, in the case of cyclones the wind speed at location z could have 
the following functional form: 
 
 
 
 
 
One starting point for getting this kind of data is to use past landfall events of cyclone 
hazards. Figure 3 below, for example, shows the number of cyclone entry points in 
Madagascar. From an institutional point of view the Meteorological Office within the 
Government should collect and analyze the data, which afterwards need to be included in 
the other modules. 
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Fig. 3: Cyclone entry points by districts in Madagascar.  
Source: Bettencourt, 2007. 
 
The elements at risk module is the building inventory. Here, it is important to capture the 
spatial distribution of the assets exposed. However, this can be done on various levels. At 
best, the inventory should also reflect regional differences in construction practice and 
building codes. Insurance companies usually require spatial resolution of the exposure 
data in the following increasing order: Storms, earthquake, flooding, man-made hazards.  
The process of inventory development can be a tedious, expensive and time-consuming 
task. However, it is a crucial part within the risk assessment process. Satellite images and 
tier classification or dasymetric mapping could be used to make the process more 
affordable. 
 
The physical vulnerability model quantifies the physical impact of the hazard on the 
exposed elements. For example, it gives the relationship between the intensity of the 
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hazard and the percentage of house damage, e.g. damage ratio. Because the intensity and 
the level of damage are uncertain, the damage itself is an uncertain quantity as well. 
Underlying each damage function is a frequency component and a severity component. 
The former determines the probability that an exposed element is damaged and the latter 
determines the percentage of property damaged, assuming damage has occurred. For 
example the relationship between damage and wind speed is dependent on the 
construction of the building, the age of the building and so on: 
 
 
 
 
 
The physical loss module translates the damages into monetary losses. Various risk 
metrics can be investigated then, e.g. Value at risk, exceedance probabilities, hazard 
maps or loss distribution functions. Again, a possible function for the total damage in 
monetary terms could be according to the following formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this manner, loss distribution functions or risk maps are calculated. Furthermore, if 
possible future changes also have to be incorporated within the model approach, each of 
the above modules have to be modeled in a dynamic setting, for example, change of the 
hazard intensity and/or frequency, changes in the vulnerability due to economic and 
social development, or change in the risk exposure.  
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Appendix A2: Method used in this report to assess cyclone risk 
 
In the case of Madagascar, detailed information that could be used within catastrophe 
models was not available and therefore one had to rely on an approach (ii) primarily 
utilizing past data and extreme value theory. For that reason, total annual cyclone losses 
(in constant 2000 USD) are used and an optimization algorithm for selecting the best fit 
under the assumption of an Extreme value distribution as well as generalized Pareto 
distribution was built. In more detail, a sequence of parameter fits were obtained based on 
a weighted average function of those data points between projected return periods, which 
subsequently were used as the next starting point iteratively over the process.   
 
As indicated in the report, there are two databases available which can be used for the 
analysis. One is the open-source EMDAT disaster database (EM_DAT, 2012) maintained 
by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université Catholique 
de Louvain. The second one is the newly produced time-series loss data by Malagasy 
officials based on the “Damage and losses assessment methodology” (from now on called 
MLoss 2012). It consists of past public sector loss estimates for the Analanjirofo region 
from 1980 to 2012 separated into different sectorial impacts. The figure’s related 
estimation procedures for all data sources can be found on the next pages. Menages, 
Public and PP are based on loss estimates from Madagascar colleagues from 1980 – 
2012. EMDAT data is based on CRED 2012 from 1960 - 2011.  A summary of estimated 
loss return periods for all respective models can be found in the next Table.  
 
Table 1:  Return period loss estimates as well as probability of first loss for all selected 
models. Losses in million USD. 
 
Return 
Period 
Menages  EMDAT  Public  PP 
  GEV  GP  GEV  GP  GEV  GP  GEV  GP 
PFL  0.4063  0.4063  0.6078 0.6078 0.4063 0.4063 0.4063  0.4063
20  5312  24595  229 223 137 149 686  745
30  6437  58366  406 388 160 173 798  867
40  7289  107650  604 570 176 191 882  954
50  7983  173020  820 766 190 204 949  1021
80  9548  469866  1551 1419 219 233 1096  1163
100  10344  754953  2094 1898 234 246 1169  1230
150  11886  1786881  3605 3215 262 270 1309  1352
200  13061  3292843  5293 4667 282 288 1412  1439
250  14021  5290321  7126 6230 299 301 1496  1506
300  14839  7792978  9083 7887 313 312 1566  1561
400  16195  14360940  13315 11440 336 329 1681  1647
500  17304  23072224  17909 15262 355 343 1773  1715
 
Note: GEV means Generalized Extreme Value distribution and GP means Pareto Distribution. 
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The graphs below can be interpreted in the following way. Number of events 
provides the number of events for the whole time period. K is the shape parameter, 
which if above 0 indicates a heavy tail. Sigma and mu are location parameters needed 
for estimating the return periods (see Embrechts et al. 1997 for a discussion). Based 
on the empirical distribution (blue line) a Generalized Pareto or Extreme value 
distribution is calculated. Furthermore, the return period of the biggest event is also 
calculated as well as the 100 year event loss.  
 
Menages Dataset: 
 
-1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
N-of-eventyrs=20
K=0.20921
sigma=1526.5316
mu=338.0979
return-of-biggest-eventyr=49.8325
100-yr-loss=10344.0028
 
-1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
N-of-eventyrs=20
K=0.20921
sigma=1526.5316
mu=338.0979
return-of-biggest-eventyr=49.8325
100-yr-loss=10344.0028
 
58 
 
 
EMDAT (2012): 
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Public sector loss (MLoss): 
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PP: assuming public losses are 20 percent of total losses 
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Appendix A3: Assessing Capital Stock and GDP  
Capital stock estimates based on the method by Sanderson and Striessnig (2009) are used 
within the report. In more detail, using the Penn World tables from 2012 the average of 
the first five years of the country’s investment series are used to back-project investment 
until 1900, assuming an annual growth rate of 4 percent in investment. The sum of all 
previous investments, discounted by the number of years since they were made, was 
taken as the initial year’s capital stock. Applying the perpetual inventory method, a rate 
of depreciation of 4 percent was assumed, which allowed for aggregating regional 
physical capital stocks for the entire period. This was compared to GDP rates from the 
World Bank and averages over the maximum time period was calculated afterwards. 
GDP to Capital Stock ratios were found to range between 8 and 10, with an average of 
9.5 in the last 20 years (see Table 1 below). 
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Table 1:  Capital Stock and Capital Stock to GDP ratios. Source: Own Calculations 
based on Penn World Tables and Sanderson and Striessnig 2009. 
 
Year  Capital Stock, bn. USD, 
 (constant 2000) 
GDP, bn. USD, 
(constant 2000) 
K to GDP 
Ratio 
1980  16.9181 3.098664  5.459805
1981  17.91717 2.798131  6.403263
1982  18.61357 2.747479  6.774782
1983  19.18217 2.772264  6.919316
1984  19.74615 2.819523  7.003368
1985  20.33853 2.852113  7.131039
1986  20.93924 2.907989  7.200591
1987  21.57163 2.942247  7.331686
1988  22.30922 3.042384  7.332809
1989  23.29629 3.16648  7.357158
1990  24.33079 3.265592  7.450654
1991  25.65518 3.059548  8.385284
1992  26.22951 3.095839  8.472505
1993  27.06453 3.160745  8.562706
1994  27.97239 3.158482  8.856276
1995  28.75026 3.212562  8.949326
1996  29.54067 3.281597  9.00192
1997  30.42926 3.402802  8.942413
1998  31.36879 3.536612  8.86973
1999  32.48021 3.701387  8.775147
2000  33.60704 3.877575  8.667025
2001  34.90154 4.110921  8.489957
2002  36.48899 3.589911  10.16431
2003  37.4812 3.94118  9.510145
2004  38.9583 4.148368  9.391236
2005  40.84781 4.339313  9.413429
2006  42.71272 4.557259  9.372459
2007  44.93726 4.841664  9.281367
2008  47.62543 5.186794  9.182055
2009  51.73387 4.949331  10.4527
2010  54.76953 5.026822  10.89546
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Appendix A4: Estimating the financial resilience of the government 
 
Financial resilience parameters are split into two categories, ex-ante, which are put into 
place before a disaster event, and ex-post sources, which require no planning to access 
after a disaster occurs. A short summary of the relevant ex-ante and ex-post sources can 
be found in Table 1, and the following section describes select parameters for 
Madagascar in greater depth.  
 
Table 1: Calculation of ex-ante and ex-post sources 
 
Type of 
source 
Method Variable in 
CATSIM Model 
Ex-ante   
Insurance Claim defined by attachment and exit point prop. Ins (%) 
Reserve 
fund 
Reserve fund is depleted to the extent necessary 
up to full depletion 
Initial RF (bn. $) 
Contingent 
credit 
Triggered to the extent necessary and "reserved in 
advance" due to payment of a fee for the 
contingent credit, involves more debt as credit 
instrument 
Contingent credit 
(on the Resilience 
input form only) 
Mitigation Damages are reduced to zero, if threshold 
exceeded full loss occurs and accumulated 
mitigation investment is lost 
Efficiency of 
Mitigation (on the 
Resilience input 
form only) 
Ex-post   
Budget 
diversion 
Maximum diversion is a fixed percentage of 
revenue 
Diversion (%) 
Aid Fixed portion of physical loss, assumed to be 
10.4% of the damage according to a regression 
analysis done with historic data (see Freeman et al 
2002a) 
Assistance (%) 
Domestic 
credit 
Maximum domestic credit available is a fixed 
fraction of the revenue 
Dom. Credit  
Foreign 
credit  
Constrained by external debt sustainability 
indicator credit buffer. It is assumed that half of 
the needed sum comes from multilateral sources 
and half from issuing international bonds 
Credit buffer (bn. $) 
and Ratio MFI/Int 
 
Insurance 
 
This ex-ante parameter refers to both traditional and/or alternative insurance mechanisms, 
such as catastrophe bonds. While private sector uptake of insurance is substantial, 
insurance of government contingent liabilities is set to zero percent in the model.  
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The parameter may be changed via the “prop. Ins (%)” variable in the Resilience file.   
 
Reserve Fund 
 
A reserve fund is a stock of money the central government has set aside for use in 
recovery from a disaster event. The input is formatted in Millions of constant 2000 US 
Dollars. The government of Madagascar has a reserve fund of approximately 20million 
USD, which is used as input for the model.  
 
To manipulate this parameter, input a new estimate into the variable titled “Initial RF 
(bn. $)” in the Resilience file.  
 
Contingent credit 
 
Contingent credit is an ex-ante risk financing measure where a central government 
arranges for guaranteed loans to be made available post-disaster event at lower rates than 
would be found in normal markets. However, a country has to pay a stipend each year 
where the loan is not accessed, and only receives a benefit if there is a disaster event, 
which triggers payout of the loan. The benefit of this type of mechanism is guaranteeing 
financing which can be made available rather quickly after a disaster, contrasted to 
normal borrowing, and is at slightly better rates than normal.  
 
For Madagascar, no such credit agreement is in place, so the variable is set to zero.  
 
To change the parameters associated with contingent credit, the applicable variables are 
located on the Resilience page of the CATSIM model, in the section for Risk Financing, 
labeled as “Contingent credit”.   
 
International Aid 
 
International aid is the amount of money made available to a country after a disaster 
event in the form of donations from other countries and aid organizations. In Freeman et 
al (2002a), the average amount of funding made available is estimated (via regression 
analysis of historic data) to be 10.4% of the direct damages from a disaster. For the 
estimates of the case of Madagascar, 10.4% is kept as a default parameter, resulting in 
10.4% of government liabilities being covered by international aid funding. 
 
This is used as a default first estimate as input to the CATSIM model as the variable 
“Aid” in the Resilience file. 
 
Budget Diversion 
 
Diversion represents the amount of funding from the central government’s budget 
available to be re-directed and focused towards disaster recovery. As a first order 
estimate, the parameter is calculated in a two step process (see Figure 1). The first step is 
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to determine whether the government has a deficit or surplus in its budget. This is 
estimated by comparing revenues and expenditures. CATSIM estimates use the latest 
year data available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, in the case of 
Madagascar, from the year 2010.  If expenditures exceed revenue by more than 5%, it is 
assumed that the government will be unable to divert funding into recovery. However, if 
there is a surplus or a smaller deficit, it is assumed that the government will be able to 
divert a portion, estimated here at 10% of total revenue, towards relief.  
 
 
Fig. 1:  Calculation of budget diversion 
 
To change the amount of diversion in the model, edit the variable labeled “Diversion” in 
the Resilience file. 
 
International / MFI Borrowing 
 
This parameter is an estimate of how much a central government would be able to borrow 
on international markets and from multi-lateral financing institutions (MFIs). Calculation 
of this value is based on numerous factors, which affect total funding available.  
 
An initial assumption is that a country cannot finance disaster losses past a point at which 
its present value of debt as a percentage of exports reaches a value higher than 150%. 
This value represents the point at which the country would be classified as a highly-
indebted poor country (HIPC) and finding additional funding would be regarded as 
extremely difficult on the open markets, due to the extremely high perceived risk to 
borrowers.  
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Other determinants to this value include the country’s classification as eligible for an 
International Development Association (IDA) or International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) loan, guaranteed by the World Bank, which may allow them to 
receive loans at concessional rates. For international borrowing, the country’s debt rating 
has a high influence on the conditions of financing, and affects total funding available. 
This rating is a major determinant for loan interest, amortization, and grace periods for 
repaying interest and principal.  
 
For exact calculation of the first order estimate of this parameter (see Figure 2), a “loan 
package” is created which divides funding needs evenly between MFI and international 
borrowing rates, determined by national debt rating, whether the country is IDA or IBRD, 
as well as current interest rates. After determining the average properties for the loan 
package (mean of the two interest rates, amortization times, and grace periods) we 
calculate how much the country can borrow and remain under the initial assumption of 
150% PV debt to export ratio.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2:  Calculation steps for determining borrowing limits 
 
In the case of Madagascar, theoretically, post-disaster borrowing from international and 
MFI sources would be possible, as the country has a very low debt to export ratio. In the 
CATSIM model, we estimate that it is possible to borrow approximately 500 million 
USD from these sources, with an equal split between the two.  
 
However, it should be noted that obtaining a loan on the international market may prove 
difficult, as credit rating agencies issue no estimates of Madagascar’s credit rating, which 
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results in a lack of visibility and creditworthiness.  However, IDA and IBRD credits are 
available to the government, and development indicators show that the country has 
received a substantial amount of these credits in the recent past.  
 
To change the amount of international and MFI credit available to the country in the 
model, the variable “Credit buffer (bn. $)” is used to indicate the amount, and “Ratio 
MFI/Int” indicates the division of the total amount between the two funding sources.  
 
Domestic credit 
 
After a disaster event, a nation has the option of trying to finance recovery via domestic 
credits, either by printing money, issuing bonds, or borrowing from domestic sources. 
This parameter must be estimated on a country-by-country basis, as it is very specific to 
individual conditions.  
 
For the case of Madagascar, we estimate that, the government will not be able to finance 
much recovery via this method. The World Bank Madagascar Economic Update (2011) 
illustrates that this assumption is probable, explaining that: 
 
If the government were to borrow 100 million USD, financing a deficit of 1.5% of 
GDP, the total stock of domestic credit would rise by 10%, crowding out private 
sector credit, leading to more monetary expansion, and lead to an increase of 
inflation. (WB, 2011) 
 
Given the above, it is assumed in the model that the government will be limited to 50 
million USD, financing a deficit of 0.75% of GDP. It is still possible to assess the affect 
of different amounts of domestic credit on the model results, by inputting new data into 
the field “Dom. Credit” in the Resilience file.  
 
Taxation 
 
The national government could also hypothetically finance some recovery via an increase 
in the tax rate. The CATSIM parameter for this value is an input of percent increase in 
taxes. While it is an option available to the government, we assume it is not used, as it 
could result in negative effects, which outpace the added funding for reconstruction, 
namely that the additional tax burden is being placed on an already over-stressed 
population that is trying to recover. For Madagascar, we assume that this option is not 
available, and set the variable to 0%. The amount of taxation can be manipulated via the 
variable “Taxation (%)” in the Resilience file. 
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Appendix A5: Macroeconomic model  
 
The following simple exogenous growth model is used. 
 
• Supply:  CD YS = A Ka Lb  
 
•  Demand side: Yd=C+I+G+X-M=C+S+T 
 
•  Investment: I=S=sY  
 
•  Capital accumulation: DK=sY-DKdep-DKCat+Irecon  
 
 
•  DKCat: stochastic disaster shock to K, random Monte Carlo draw from 
distribution 
•  Irecon  
• Algorithm for finding additional savings for reconstruction to 
continue growth 
• Based on resource gap concept: lack of financial resources for 
achieving growth targets (Chenery and Strout 1966) 
 
•  Caveats: no learning or technological progress 
 
The Resource gap estimation within the macroeconomic model is described below  
 
The physical damage translates into a financial loss for the government after subtracting 
all ex ante and ex post sources. The existing options are used to the extent necessary. If 
all of the physical damage can be covered by ex-ante and ex-post options the financial 
loss is zero. Otherwise if after exhausting all ex-ante and ex-post sources, there still is a 
net loss, i.e. a resource gap, part of lost capital stock will remain unreplaced, affecting 
GDP and leading to lowering revenue in the next period. Table 4 shows how the ex-ante 
and ex-post instruments resources are determined. 
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Table 1: Calculation of ex-ante and ex-post sources 
Type of source Method 
Ex-ante  
Insurance Claim defined by attachment and exit point 
Reserve fund Reserve fund is depleted to the extent necessary up to full depletion 
Contingent 
credit 
Triggered to the extent necessary and "reserved in advance" due to 
payment of a fee for the contingent credit, involves more debt as credit 
instrument 
Mitigation Damages are reduced to zero, if threshold exceeded full loss occurs and 
accumulated mitigation investment is lost 
Ex-post  
Budget 
diversion 
Maximum diversion is fixed percentage of revenue 
Aid Fixed portion of physical loss, assumed to be 10.4% of the damage 
according to a regression analysis done with historic data (see Freeman 
et al 2002a) 
Domestic credit Maximum domestic credit available is a fixed fraction of the revenue 
Foreign credit  Constrained by external debt sustainability indicator credit buffer. It is 
assumed that half of the needed sum comes from multilateral sources 
and half from issuing international bonds 
 
In more detail, let the (monetary) loss distribution for the government be called F. 
Furthermore, assume that the government has “k” instruments (either ex-post and/or ex-
ante) available to finance the losses. In case of a disaster event some or all of the 
instruments are used to a given amount to finance the losses. In the easiest case, there is a 
strict preference order between the financing instruments, represented by the resource 
vector ′= ),...,( 1 kxxxr in the following way: the first instrument (with monetary resources 
1x ) is preferred before all others until depletion, afterwards the second instrument (with 
resources 2x ) is preferred before all others until depletion, and so on. Let 
′= ),...,( 1 mkmm xxxr  be the maximal (monetary) amount available for each instrument for a 
given loss event. Then the loss financing scheme for a given event with return period 
y/1 (e.g. for a 100 year event y would be 0.01) is the solution of depleting resources in 
the respective order till the losses ( )(1 yF − ) are fully financed. In the case that 
)(11 yFxki mi
−
= ≤∑ , one says that a resource gap occurred, and the return period of the event 
where this happens for the first time (i.e. all events with lower return periods satisfies 
equation )(11 yF
k
i mix
−==∑ ) is called the critical return period. As indicated, resource 
gaps will have (possible long-term) economic consequences which are assessed by the 
economic module. 
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Appendix A6: Multi Risk Assessment 
 
Regarding multi risk assessment, an elegant way of combining losses could be via the 
notion of dependent and independent risk (see Hochrainer and Pflug 2012). Assume for 
the moment that one has estimated a loss distribution for two independent hazards, i.e. we 
assume to have two random variables X and Y, with cumulative distribution functions FX 
and FY. Our goal is to observe the distribution of Z, which is defined to be the sum of the 
two random variables, i.e. Z=X+Y. If X and Y are comonotonic, i.e. FX(X) is always equal 
to FY(Y), then the value of Z corresponding to a given probability p is simply the sum of 
the values of X and Y corresponding to the same p, i.e. 
 
)(1)(1)(1 pYFpXFpZF
−+−=− ,       10 ≤≤ p                                     (1) 
 
On the other hand, if X and Y are independent, then FZ equals the convolution of both 
distributions using the Stieltjes integral: 
 
∫∞∞− −= )()()( xYdFxtXFtZF ,        ∞<<∞− t                              (2) 
 
Now, let’s assume that up to a given probability level, say threshp _  the variables X and 
Y are independent and afterwards comonotonic. This premise can be made more precise 
as follows. Suppose that )_(1 threshpFX X
−≥  occurs if and only if )_(1 threshpFY Y−≥ , 
and in that case )()( YFXF YX =  holds. In the case )_(1 threshpFX X−<  (equivalently 
)_(1 threshpFY Y
−< ) the two variables are independent. Then, the distribution of Z is 
given by separate formulae over the comonotonic part and over the independent part. For 
the comonotonic part we would have 
 
                 )(1)(1)(1 pYFpXFpZF
−+−=− ,            1_ ≤≤ pthreshp                      (3) 
 
and for the independent part 
 
  ∫
−
∞−
−=
)_(1
)()()(
threshpZF
xYdFxtXFtZF ,            )_(
1 threshpFt Z
−<<∞− ,              (4) 
 
with )_(1 threshpZF
−  given by (3). 
 
 
One overarching advantage of such an approach is not only the analysis of the total risk 
within a coherent manner but also that well developed risk metrics (or functionals) could 
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be applied to them, making decisions about frequent events (using averages) and 
extremes (using fat tail metrics) simultaneously possible. Furthermore, if loss reduction 
measures and risk financial measures beneficial for multi risk are analyzed in the single 
case scenario it is also directly possible with the approach suggested to analyze the total 
benefits in a comprehensive way.  
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Appendix A7: Workshop Details 
 
Workshop  
 
Financial and Economic Disaster Risks in Madagascar  
Implementation and use of the CatSim Approach 
 
30 April – 04 May 2012 
Antananarivo, Madagascar 
 
 
Participants       
 
Madagascar  
 
‐ Representatives/technicians of Ministry of Finance and Budget: 13 
‐ Representatives/technicians of Ministry of Economy and Industry: 4 
‐ Representatives of the “CERED” (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches 
Economiques pour le Développement) / Université d’Antananarivo FACDEGS : 3 
‐ Representatives of the DGM (Direction Générale de la Météorologie) : 2 
‐ Representative of the World Bank : 1 
‐ Representatives of the CPGU and Track II Project : 7 
‐ Representative of the “BNGRC” (Bureau National de Gestion des Risques et des 
catastrophes): 1  
IIASA  
 
‐ Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler 
‐ Keith Williges 
 
 
 
 
Topics        
 
? Risk assessment and analysis of extremes 
? Economic risk assessment: macro, micro, sectoral 
? Risk modelling using CATSIM 
? Discussion of risk management options  
? Discussion of uncertainty and variability: Climate change, exposure dynamics etc. 
? Training 
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Objective        
 
The workshop will familiarize the participants with catastrophe modelling approaches, 
incl. a discussion of the basics of catastrophe modelling, direct vs. indirect risk 
assessment and risk management strategies on local, regional and country levels. The 
participants will learn about the obstacles and difficulties in catastrophe modeling and 
how to avoid them. Focus will be on the CatSim approach as well as understanding the 
framework and possible uses. Furthermore, they will be trained with the help of a stand-
alone software package. To a large extent, the workshop will provide hands on training 
using the IIASA CatSim methodology and running and installing the software package.  
The workshop should provide participants with the necessary know-how to conduct 
similar analyses, which will feed into the economic risk assessment element for 
mainstreaming natural disaster risk into development planning processes.  
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 AGENDA 
 
Monday, 30 April and Tuesday 1 May:  
Pre-Workshop meetings (Only consultants, including preparation work for Wednesday):  
• General discussion  
• Setting up CatSim software 
• Discussion of input parameters and data formats  
• Revising numbers and additional estimations (done by consultants on 1. May) 
 
  
 
Wednesday, 2 May – Workshop Day 1: at Hotel “Louvre” Antaninarenina 
 
9.00 Arrival 
9.15-11.00 (Presenter: Madagascar government officials, Hochrainer-Stigler, Williges) 
• Welcome, Introduction to the workshop and overview  
• Status of and update on the study on assessing risk with the following items to be 
discussed  
 
• Introduction to risk modelling  (Hochrainer-Stigler, Keith Williges) 
o Risk modelling: the basic paradigm 
o Assessing economic impacts of disasters: Direct vs. indirect risk 
o Risk management: Budget planning process and economic modeling 
 
11.00-11.15 Coffee break 
11.15-12.30 
• Catastrophe modelling approaches: Key elements (Hochrainer-Stigler) 
12.30-13.30 Lunch 
13.30-15.00 
• Catastrophe modelling: The CATSIM approach (Hochrainer-Stigler)  
15.00-15.30 Coffee 
 
 
15.30-17.45 
•  CatSim methodology: Overview of CatSim parameters used to run the model for 
Madagascar  
• Wrap up and discussion (All) 
17.45 End of Day 1 
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Thursday, 3 May – Workshop Day 2: at Hotel “Louvre” Antaninarenina 
 
9.00 Arrival 
9.15-10.30  
• Revisiting of issues (All)  
• Update on CATSIM model and approach used (Hochrainer-Stigler) 
•  Questions addressed 
10.30-10.45 Coffee 
10.45-12:30 
• CatSim demonstration continued based on Madagascar pre-estimates (to be 
brought by participants) 
12.30-13.30 Lunch 
13.30-15.00 
•  Risk management strategies on the local and country level (Hochrainer-Stigler) 
• Continuation of working groups and discussion of approach including risk 
management options  
15.00-15.30 Coffee 
15.30-17.00 
• Final discussion including possible scope and ambition of the economic risk 
assessment and identification of roles of participants (Officials, Hochrainer-
Stigler, Williges) 
17.45 End of Day 2 
 
Friday, 4 May – Training:  
 
9.00 Arrival 
9.15-10.30 Training 
• Revisiting of issues (All)  
10.30-10.45 Coffee 
• Training 
12.30-13.30 Lunch 
13.30-15.00 
• Continuation of training including risk management options assessment (All) 
15.00-15.30 Coffee 
• Final discussion (All) 
16.30 End of Day 3 
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Material Presented: Summary 
A total of 11 sessions thematic were covered and 300 slides presented. Power point 
presentations were made available to the participants beforehand and can also be found 
under http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~hochrain/Madagascar/.  
 
• Presentation Day 1 Madagascar Session 1 Introduction: 34 slides 
• Presentation Day 1 Madagascar Session 2 Policy Examples: 32 slides 
• Presentation Day 1 Madagascar Session 3 The case of Madagascar: 24 slides 
• Presentation Day 1 Madagascar Session 4 Direct Indirect Risk: 16 slides 
• Presentation Day 1 Madagascar Session 5 Government risk and risk management: 
40 slides 
• Presentation Day 1 Madagascar Session 6 CatSim Methodology: 27 slides 
• Presentation Day 2 Madagascar Session 1 Introduction: 11 slides 
• Presentation Day 2 Madagascar Session 2 Cat Modelling: 25 slides 
• Presentation Day 2 Madagascar Session 3 Exemplary CatSim run: 30 slides  
• Presentation Day 2 Madagascar Session 4 Step by step analysis based on report: 
25 slides 
• Presentation Day 3 Madagascar Session Training CatSim run: 31 slides 
 
Programming Code: Summary 
 
More than 40 000 programming lines were produced for the new CatSim version for 
Madagascar, including the new multi risk assessment module.  
 
CatSim manual:  
 
Total of 59 pages. 
 
